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Dissociating Stimulus-Set and Response-Set in the Context of
Task-Set Switching
Paul D. Kieffaber
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Raymond Y. Cho

Philip M. Walker

University of Pittsburgh and Center for the Neural Basis of
Cognition, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
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The primary aim of the present research was to determine how stimulus-set and response-set components
of task-set contribute to switch costs and conflict processing. Three experiments are described wherein
participants completed an explicitly cued task-switching procedure. Experiment 1 established that task
switches requiring a reconfiguration of both stimulus- and response-set incurred larger residual switch
costs than task switches requiring the reconfiguration of stimulus-set alone. Between-task interference
was also drastically reduced for response-set conflict compared with stimulus-set conflict. A second
experiment replicated these findings and demonstrated that stimulus- and response-conflict have dissociable effects on the “decision time” and “motor time” components of total response time. Finally, a third
experiment replicated Experiment 2 and demonstrated that the stimulus- and response- components of
task switching and conflict processing elicit dissociable neural activity as evidence by event-related brain
potentials.
Keywords: task-set, cognitive control, task-switching, ERP, EEG

chologists too have been intrigued by the time-costs of switching
tasks and have sought to describe the nature of these “switch costs”
for decades (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Jersild, 1927; Rogers
& Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 1976). Common to this
longstanding literature is the concept of mental set, which refers to
a flexible, context-sensitive configuration of perceptual, cognitive,
and response biases that can facilitate the performance of contextappropriate behavior (See Gibson, 1941; Shakow, 1962). Because
the context is commonly defined by the task at hand, the term
“task-set” is often used. Questions about the updating and switching of task-set are also at the heart of the ongoing debate over the
nature of deficits of cognitive control and of context processing in
clinical populations (Barch, Carter, MacDonald, Braver, & Cohen,
2003; Kieffaber, O’Donnell, Shekhar, & Hetrick, 2007; Meiran,
Levine, Meiran, & Henik, 2000).
Contemporary interest in questions about the nature of cognitive
control in the context of task-set switching has led to a number of
important conclusions (See Kiesel et al., 2010, for a review), not the
least of which is that there are a variety of mechanisms for cognitive
control of task-switching that are likely to interact with one another in
complex ways (J. W. Brown, Reynolds, & Braver, 2007). While
much of current theorizing in the task switching literature relates to
the nature of task-set updating, relatively few have addressed the
internal structure of the relatively complex tasks which are commonly
used in the literature on task-switching. Thus, the primary aim of the
present research was to determine how two components of that

Central to the adaptability of human behavior is our capacity to
dynamically modify perceptual and cognitive processing in accordance with current goals. This cognitive flexibility does, however,
appear to come with a time-cost associated with switching between
tasks. Appreciation for the costs of task-switching is evidenced by
modern industrial developments such as the assembly line. Psy-
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internal structure, stimulus-set and response-set, influence measures
of control and conflict in task-switching.
The task-switching procedure remains a popular procedure for
research regarding cognitive control because it yields two important conditions under which control is thought to be elicited. First,
proactive control of task-set (i.e., task preparation) is thought to
occur in anticipation of the need to switch tasks. Proactive control
is typically thought to be elicited either between trials (the intertrial interval) when the task order is predictable (e.g., “AABB” or
alternating runs; see Rogers & Monsell, 1995) or, when the order
of tasks is unpredictable, after an explicit cue indicating which task
to perform. In healthy participants, responses are typically longer
and more error-prone when the task performed on the previous
trial is different from the task required on the current trial. However, increasing the duration of the intertrial interval (Rogers &
Monsell, 1995) or the cue-target interval (Sudevan & Taylor,
1987) can significantly decrease the magnitude of these switch
costs, supporting the hypothesis that the intertrial or cue-target
intervals contain a task-set switching process (Rogers & Monsell,
1995; Kiesel et al., 2010). Importantly, however, many studies
demonstrate that significant switch costs remain despite ample
preparation for a task switch (Allport, Wylie, Humphreys, Duncan,
& Treisman, 1999; Allport et al., 1994; Fagot, 1995; Rushworth,
Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 2002; Yeung & Monsell, 2003).
The presence of these residual switch costs has generated some
debate over the nature of proactive preparation of task-set. For
example, some theoretical models assume that the preparatory
process is switch-specific, including a “task-reconfiguration” component that is not present on trials in which the task is repeated
(e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans,
2001), while others assume that the same processes take place on
both switch and repeat trials, but to a greater extent on switch trials
(e.g., Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; Koch, 2005). Support for
a general rather than switch-specific preparatory process can be
garnered from the findings that either increasing a delay between
cue and target stimuli or increasing the certainty (by manipulating
target probability) with which a particular target appears will
reduce response time and improve accuracy in both switch and
repetition trials (Kiesel et al., 2010). Additionally, a positive
event-related brain potential (ERP) over parietal recording sites
has been reliably shown to be increased in amplitude after a cue to
switch tasks (Hsieh, 2002; F. Karayanidis, Colthearth, Michie, &
Murphy, 2003). This positivity, however, likely reflects a number
of task-relevant processes given that some studies reveal that this
positivity is also present to a lesser extent on repetition trials
(Kieffaber & Hetrick, 2005; Jost, Mayr, & Rosler, 2008).
The second cognitive control-eliciting condition afforded by
task-switching procedures is referred to as task-rule congruency or
“conflict processing.” Because stimuli are typically bivalent with
respect to the tasks, meaning that they afford decisions relevant to
both tasks, cognitive control is thought to be needed to protect
against the impingement of competing, task-irrelevant information
on ongoing information processing. Conflict is said to occur when
the currently irrelevant information in a stimulus display indicates
a response that is incongruent with the correct response. Response
time delays in the context of these incongruent stimuli are commonly observed and interpreted as a failure to gate-out irrelevant
information amid the processing of both relevant and irrelevant
features of a polyvalent stimulus (Ward, Roberts, & Phillips, 2001;
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Schooler, Neumann, Caplan, & Roberts, 1997; Jensen & Rohwer,
1966).
As is the case with proactive cognitive control, there is some
debate as to the nature of these conflict effects. For example, there
is evidence that greater between-task interference is suffered when
the same response-set is assigned to the two tasks (i.e., univalent
response mapping) compared with when each task is assigned a
unique response-set (i.e., bivalent response mapping; Klein, 1964;
Yeung & Monsell, 2003). That is, the potential for conflict appears
to be greater when the same abstract judgments (e.g., red/blue,
same/different, etc.) are made about exemplars from each of the
two tasks. Some have argued that this finding is suggestive of a
gating mechanism capable of attenuating the interference from
irrelevant decision-response mappings (Yeung & Monsell, 2003).
This finding further suggests that between-task interference may
be suffered at different levels depending the internal structure of
their respective task-sets which defines how stimulus dimensions
are mapped to abstract judgments, how judgments are mapped to
decisions, and how decisions are mapped to responses.
One example of how the internal structure of task-set can be
parsed is the distinction between stimulus-set and response-set.
Stimulus-set refers to sensory/perceptual processes related to the
discriminative selection and identification of relevant stimuli,
whereas response-set refers to response-delegation processes governing the application of rules to the selection of relevant responses (Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; Kopp, Tabeling, Moschner, & Wessel, 2006; Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre, 2002). In
cases where research has aimed to isolate stimulus-set (i.e., semantic; M. Brown & Besner, 2001; Klein, 1964) or response-set
(Milham et al., 2001; West, Bowry, & McConville, 2004), in the
context of between-task interference, each has been shown to lead
to significant conflict-costs. However, efforts to simultaneously
estimate their unique contributions using a Stroop task reveal only
that both are likely to influence performance (De Houwer, 2003;
van Veen & Carter, 2005). One caveat to interpreting such data
from the Stroop task is that performance depends heavily on
preexisting stimulus–response associations, making it difficult to
make direct comparisons between the various types of conflict
elicited.
Consideration of the dissociation between stimulus-set and
response-set may also be informative in the context of task switching. Although similar distinctions appear in the task-switching
literature (e.g., Barch et al., 1999; Crider, 1997; Elliott, McKenna,
Robbins, & Sahakian, 1998; Henik et al., 2002), and in studies of
focal brain lesions (Aron, Monsell, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2004),
only a few studies have directly explored the explicit manipulation
of stimulus- and/or response-set in the context of task switching
(Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; Kieffaber et al., 2006; Kopp et
al., 2006; Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre, 2002; Rushworth,
Hadland, et al., 2002; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). In cases where
efforts have been made to isolate the response-set component of
task-set, both response-mapping reversals (Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & Cramon, 2000)
and effector switches (Brass et al., 2003; West, Bailey, & Langley,
2009) have been demonstrated to produce significant switch costs,
indicating that at least part of the switch cost is attributable to the
need to overcome previously valid response mappings.
Historically, consideration of this distinction between stimulus-set
and response-set has been complicated by the fact that many of the
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reported set effects originate from experimental procedures that confound stimulus selection and response delegation. For example, a
typical task-switching procedure will require participants to judge a
compound letter/number stimulus (e.g., 5E) according to whether the
number is odd or even, or whether the letter is a vowel or a consonant.
Because odd, even, vowel, & consonant decisions are often assigned
to two (left/right) responses, both stimuli and responses are bivalent,
meaning that switching between tasks requires one to reconfigure
stimulus-set so as to improve processing of the relevant stimulus
attribute (i.e., letter or number) and reconfigure response-set so as to
bias the appropriate set of decision-response mappings (e.g., Odd ¡
Left and Even ¡ Right, or Vowel ¡ Left and Consonant ¡ Right).
A schematic of this conventional task-switching procedure is illustrated in Figure 1A.
There is evidence that this kind of response bivalency influences task performance as well as the recruitment of neural
resources. For example, Brass et al. (2003) manipulated response mappings such that the same response was used to
achieve different goals (e.g., response bivalency). They report
increased switch costs for tasks with a bivalent response mapping along with imaging data suggesting that an interaction
between task-switching and response valence is related to neural activity in regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex (Brass et
al., 2003). In contrast, however, Mueller et al. (2007) later
reported equivalent switch costs in bivalent and univalent conditions using a similar manipulation.
One difficulty with the interpretation of these findings with
respect to the notion of response-set is that the two responsesets in Mueller et al.’s (2007) univalent condition were mapped
to separate hands (i.e., effectors) for each of the two tasks.
Thus, switches between univalent response sets were confounded with effector switches (See West et al., 2009). Because

A

Odd
Parity
Even

Left

Vowel

Right

3E
Grammar
Consonant

B
Shape

Same

Left

Size

Different

Right

Figure 1. Schematic depiction of (A) a conventional task switching
procedure and (B) a procedure used by Kieffaber and Hetrick (2005) to
isolate stimulus-set switches. The boxes indicate target stimuli. Moving
from left to right, the first and second set of arrows are intended to depict
the internal structure of stimulus-set, selectively gating information that
corresponds with the current task-relevant decisions. The third set of
arrows depict the internal structure of response-set, selectively activating
task and decision-appropriate responses.

response bivalency in the typical task-switching procedure requires the remapping of response meanings without changing
the effector(s) (see Figure 1), we conceive of the response-set
switching process as one that may occur independently of the
selection of an effector with which to implement a given
decision-response mapping.
Research by Hübner, Futterer, and Steinhauser (2001) similarly
highlights the importance of considering the internal structure of
the task-set implicit to procedures like that depicted in Figure 1.
For example, Hübner et al. (2001) demonstrated that switch costs
can be modulated by the number of task “components” being
switched with larger switch costs incurred during switches of two
by comparison with one component operation. Likewise, Arrington and colleagues (2003) demonstrated that switch costs were
reduced for tasks which share component operations, suggesting
that proactive control may operate in a multidimensional taskspace defined by the internal structure of the task. While many
parameters of the task-space may be task-general (i.e., shared by
many tasks), these findings suggest that at least part of task-set
preparation is specific to those parameters which uniquely define
the task being switched to.
While much of current theorizing in the task switching literature relates to the processes of proactive control and conflict
processing, relatively few have addressed the internal structure
of the relatively complex tasks which are commonly used to
elicit these control mechanisms. Thus, the primary aim of the
present study was to test a distinction between stimulus-set and
response-set in terms of the internal structure of task-set. To do
so, a novel task was developed that interleaves trials with
univalent and bivalent response-sets. This novel procedure required participants to alternate unpredictably between three
tasks, each requiring the judgment of a pair of figures on one
stimulus dimension (Shape, Size, or Color). Two of the tasks
required a Comparison judgment wherein participants were
asked to decide whether the figures in the pair were “same” or
“different.” The third task required an Identity judgment
wherein participants were asked to decide whether the figures in
the pair had the (shared) value A or value B. In one group of
participants, for example, the Shape and Size tasks required a
judgment as to whether the pair of figures were the same or
different on the task-relevant dimension of shape or size and the
Color task required participants to judge whether the shared
color of the pair of figures was red or blue. Because the
assignment of the Shape, Size, and Color tasks to the Comparison or Identity judgments is made explicit to the participant,
the cue informs the participant about both the relevant stimulusand response-set. A schematic of the internal structure of this
hypothetical task-set structure is presented in Figure 2.
Importantly, the pathways constituting the internal structure
of task-set depicted in Figure 2 all represent arbitrary stimulusdecision and/or decision-response mappings. That is, rather
than take advantage of inherent semantic or spatial relationships
or preexisting task-set biases (e.g., a predisposition to read
words), hypotheses regarding the present task rely entirely on
differences between the task-sets that are defined by the internal
structure depicted in Figure 2. This schematic is also illustrative
of our assumptions regarding the role of stimulus & response
bivalency and, by extension, switches of stimulus- and
response-set. Thus, the first prediction that can be derived from
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Figure 2. Schematic depiction of the current task. Again, arrows are
intended to depict cognitive representations of attentional selection,
decision-making, and response-mapping. Open symbols ⫽ red, closed
symbols ⫽ blue.

the internal structure depicted in Figure 2 is that switches of
stimulus-set (SWS; e.g., a switch from Shape to Size; see Figure
2) will require only a change to those pathways priming the
perceptual judgment whereas switches of stimulus and response
set (SWSR; e.g., a switch from Color to Size; see Figure 2) will
require changes to those pathways priming the perceptual judgment and those pathways priming the decision-response mappings. Given previous research has illustrated that the costs of
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task-set switching are correlated with the number of parameters
being switched (Hübner et al., 2001; Arrington et al., 2003), we
expect that SWSR trials will incur larger switch costs than SWS
trials.
Predictions regarding between-task conflict can similarly be derived from the structure of Figure 2. When considering only those two
judgments which share a response mapping (e.g., Shape and Size in
Figure 2), an established stimulus-set will gate potentially conflicting,
task-irrelevant information. However, when considering two judgments which do not share a decision-response mapping (e.g., Shape
and Color in Figure 2), an established stimulus-set will gate taskirrelevant information and an established response-set will gate taskirrelevant response activation. Thus, it is expected that the cumulative
gating of stimulus-set and response-set will protect against conflict
effects when responses are bivalent by comparison with the gating of
stimulus-set alone when responses are univalent. In fact, because there
are two alternative tasks on each trial, each of which is associated
with either stimulus-set or response-set conflict, there are four levels
of conflict possible in the current task (See Figure 3): (1) Stimulus-set
and response-set are both congruent with current task goals (SCRC).
(2) There is congruency only at the level of stimulus-set (SCRI). (3)
There is congruency only at the level of the response-set (SIRC). (4)
There is incongruency in both stimulus-set and response-set (SIRI).
Given the assumptions outlined above, it is expected that (1) shorter
RTs to SCRC trials than SCRI trials will reflect the presence of
significant response-set conflict, (2) shorter RTs to SCRC trials than

SIRI

SIRC

Shape

Same

Size

Different

Color

Red

Left

Right

Shape

Same

Size

Different

Color

Red

Blue

Left

Right

Blue

SC R I

SCRC

Shape

Same

Size

Different

Color

Red

Blue

Left

Right

Shape

Same

Size

Different

Color

Red

Left

Right

Blue

Figure 3. Schematic depiction of the four conflict types that are possible in the context of the current task. Note
that the relevant task is “Shape” and that solid arrows depict only the correct routes for information processing.
Open symbols ⫽ red, closed symbols ⫽ blue.
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SIRC trials will reflect the presence of significant stimulus-set conflict,
and (3) Shorter RTs to SCRI than SIRC will reflect the critical
prediction that the cumulative gating of stimulus-set and response-set
will elicit smaller costs of between-task conflict.

Experiment 1: Stimulus-Set Versus Response-Set

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Method
Participants. Forty-five (30 male, 15 female) participants
from Indiana University received partial credit in an introductory
psychology course for their participation. The average age of
participants was 19.3 (SD ⫽ 1.2) years. The experiment was
conducted with the understanding and consent of each participant
(Indiana University, Bloomington, Study #00 – 4038). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and
normal color vision.
Procedure and stimuli. Participants were individually seated
in front of a standard CRT monitor in a small room. After giving
informed consent, participants completed a brief demographic
questionnaire and then began the task. Target stimuli consisted of
figure-pairs that varied in shape (circle/square), size (large/small),
and color (red/blue). On each trial, participants were instructed by
an explicit cue (the word SHAPE, SIZE, or COLOR) to make a
judgment about the figure pair according to the cued dimension.
The cue remained on screen for 350 ms, and the target figures
appeared after a 500-ms cue–target interval (see Figure 4. In
addition to indicating the relevant stimulus dimension, each of the
task-cues also indicated a task-relevant response-set. Two of the
tasks required a Comparison decision (e.g., same/different) about
the two figures (on the cued dimension), and one of the tasks
required an Identity decision (i.e., circle/square, large/small, or
red/blue) about the pair of figures. The assignment of the three
stimulus dimensions (Shape, Size, & Color) to the two types of
judgments was counterbalanced across subjects. Importantly, the

value of the two figures on the dimension assigned to Identity
judgment was always the same within a trial. For example, if the
shape and size dimensions were assigned to the Comparison judgment and color were assigned to the Identity judgment (i.e.,
Color-ID condition), then the two figures in any given stimulus
display could vary in both shape and size, but were always the
same color (either red or blue). Participants were randomly assigned to one of these three (Color-ID, n ⫽ 17; Shape-ID, n ⫽ 12;
and Size-ID, n ⫽ 16) conditions and labels indicating the taskappropriate responses were placed over the Caps Lock and Enter
keys of a standard QWERTY keyboard. Same, Square, Large, and
Red decisions were mapped to one key and Different, Circle,
Small, and Blue decisions were mapped to another key. The
assignment of response labels to the Caps Lock and Enter keys was
randomly assigned for each participant. A schematic of the task
procedure is presented in Figure 4.
The task consisted of four blocks of 120 trials, and participants
were permitted a brief break between each block. Task switches
occurred following either one (n ⫽ 120) or three (n ⫽ 120)
presentations of the previous rule. This staggered trial sequence
yielded an overall task sequence wherein the global probability of
a task switch is 0.5, and the local transitional probability of a
switch is also 0.5 on 50% of the trials. Each of the three switch
(SWSR, SWS, and ST (i.e., “stay”)) and four congruency (SCRC,
SCRI, SIRC, SCRC) trial types were equally represented throughout
the experiment.
Data analysis. Because judgments in the Comparison and
Identity tasks are fundamentally different and because stimulus-set
conflict could only occur in the context of the comparison judgments, tests of the primary hypotheses were addressed using data
only from the comparison judgments. Response times and accuracy rates for the 12 trial types created by the factorial combination
of the Switch (SWSR, SWS, and ST) and Congruency (SCRC, SCRI,
SIRC, and SIRI) factors were submitted individually to a
Switch (3) ⫻ Congruency (4) repeated measures ANOVA. Response times from the Identity task were analyzed separately and
are presented in the Appendix. With respect to the Identity task, all
trials involving a task switch are SWSR trials and between-task
conflict can only occur at the level of response-set. Thus, response
times to the Identity task were analyzed by a Switch (2; SWSR and
ST) ⫻ Congruency (3; RC, R1C, and RI) repeated measures
ANOVA where R1C refers to those trials in which the correct
response to only 1 of the alternative tasks was congruent with the
currently relevant correct response. Because there were no significant between-groups differences across the three ResponseMapping conditions (see the Appendix), and because concerns
regarding task-specific variability are assuaged by the fact that the
mapping between task and identification/comparison judgments
was counterbalanced across participants, the data were aggregated
across subjects for the three Response-Mapping conditions. Moreover, data were aggregated within participants over the two comparison tasks. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p values are provided
where appropriate.

Results and Discussion

Figure 4. Procedural schematic of Experiment 1.

Accuracy. Mean accuracy for each of the conditions is illustrated in panel A of Figure 5. Overall performance on the task was
good (M ⫽ 92.6%, SD ⫽ 5.7%). Accuracy rates were submitted to
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Figure 5. Accuracy (A) and response times (B) across conflict types for
each of the three switch conditions.

a Switch (3) by Congruency (4) repeated measures ANOVA. A
significant main effect of Switch indicated that there were omnibus
accuracy costs associated with task-switching, F(2, 88) ⫽ 4.69,
p ⬍ .05. However, planned comparisons revealed that accuracy on
SWS (M ⫽ 0.93%, SD ⫽ 0.06%) was not significantly different
from ST trials (M ⫽ 0.93%, SD ⫽ 0.05%) and that accuracy on
SWSR trials (M ⫽ 0.92%, SD ⫽ 0.06%) was not significantly
different from SWS trials.
The main effect of Congruency was also significant in the
accuracy rates, F(3, 132) ⫽ 17.03, p ⬍ .001. Planned comparisons
revealed that there were not significant accuracy costs in SCRI
(M ⫽ 0.95%, SD ⫽ 0.06%) by comparison with SCRC (M ⫽
0.95%, SD ⫽ 0.05%) trials. However, accuracy costs were evident
in the comparison of SIRC (M ⫽ 0.91%, SD ⫽ 0.08%) and SCRC
trials, p ⬍ .01, indicating significant costs of stimulus-set conflict.
Finally, accuracy costs were significantly larger in SIRC by comparison with SCRI trials, p ⬍ .01, indicating that the impact of
response-set conflict was reduced by comparison with stimulus-set
conflict. The interaction between Switch and Congruency was not
significant.
Response time. Mean RTs for each condition are illustrated in
panel B of Figure 5. Response times (RT; 10% trimmed), excluding error trials and trials immediately after an error, were submitted to a Switch (3) by Congruency (4) repeated measures ANOVA.
A main effect of Switch indicated that there were significant RT
switch costs, F(2, 88) ⫽ 28.27, p ⬍ .001. Planned comparisons
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revealed that switch costs were significant in SWS (M ⫽ 750.40
ms, SD ⫽ 154.09) compared with ST trials (M ⫽ 714.15ms, SD ⫽
129.95), p ⬍ .01. Moreover and in accordance with predictions,
there were significant additional RT costs in SWSR (M ⫽
793.62ms, SD ⫽ 163.57) trials by comparison with SWS trials,
p ⬍ .001.
A main effect of Congruency, F(3, 132) ⫽ 42.12, p ⬍ .001,
reflected the impact of between-task conflicts. Planned comparisons
revealed significant RT costs associated with both response-set conflict (e.g., SCRI (M ⫽ 730.91ms, SD ⫽ 143.01) ⬎ SCRC(M ⫽
699.49ms, SD ⫽ 135.98)), p ⬍ .01, and stimulus-set conflict (e.g.,
SIRC (M ⫽ 780.08ms, SD ⫽ 150.90) ⬎ SCRC), p ⬍ .001. Critically,
however, RTs were significantly faster to SCRI by comparison with
SIRC, p ⬍ .001, confirming the prediction that greater between-task
interference would be suffered when between-task conflict is gated
only at the level of stimulus-set.
Finally, the interaction between factors of Switch and Congruency was also significant, F(6, 264) ⫽ 2.90, p ⬍ .05. To better
understand how SWSR differed from SWS and ST trials across the
levels of Congruency, switch costs were computed as difference
scores (e.g., SWSR ⫺ ST and SWS ⫺ ST; hereafter referred to as
SWSR costs and SWS costs, respectively). The pattern of these RT
costs across the four levels of Congruency was then analyzed by a
2 (Switch; SWSR, SWS) by 4 (Congruency; SCRC, SCRI, SIRC, and
SIRI) repeated measures ANOVA. The Switch by Congruency
interaction was significant, F(3, 132) ⫽ 2.73, p ⬍ .05, and was
clearly driven by an increase in the SWSR costs on SCRC and SCRI
trial types (see Figure 6).
Taken together, the data largely supported predictions. First, the
finding that SWSR trials by comparison with SWS trials were
associated with significantly greater switch costs (both RT and
accuracy) validates the claim that arbitrary response mappings
constitute an additional component of task-set that contributes
significantly to the switch cost. Second, the finding that SCRI trials
by comparison with SIRC incurred smaller congruency costs (both
RT and accuracy) is consistent with the internal structure of
task-set depicted in Figure 2 and with the hypothesis that stimulusset and response-set act as cumulative filters for task-irrelevant
information processing.

Figure 6. Task switching costs across levels of congruency (bars depict
standard error of the mean).
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The interaction between Switch and Congruency is more difficult to interpret. Task-set inertia (Allport et al., 1994; Wylie &
Allport, 2000) and similar hypotheses of the switch costs assert
that the priming of task-irrelevant pathways on previous trials will
increase between-task interference following a task switch. The
fact that SWSR switches were associated with larger switch costs
on SCRI trials (which contain response-set conflict) is consistent
with such residual priming, however the fact that similar increases
were observed for SCRC trials is incompatible with such explanations. It should also be noted, however, that while switch costs are
often observed to be larger on incongruent trials, the anticipated
interaction is typically slight (Meiran & Kessler, 2008). Moreover,
there is evidence that the strength of the interaction dissipates with
longer cue-target intervals that are similar to the range used in the
current study (Goschke & Driver, 2000). Casting some doubt on
the practical significance of this interaction, a similar interaction
was nonsignificant in previous research using a nested version of
the present task and long (1200 ms) cue-target intervals (Kieffaber
et al., 2006, 2007). In light of these caveats, this finding will not
receive further discussion.

Experiment 2: Decision Time Versus Motor Time
The data from Experiment 1 support the hypothetical internal
structure of task-set depicted in Figure 2. However, implicit to that
depiction is that stimulus-set and response-set impact dissociable
points of information processing and may thus have dissociable
effects on the selection and execution of responses. In fact, previous research using a nested version of this task that included only
switches of stimulus-set (see Figure 1B) suggests that the effects of
stimulus-set switches and stimulus-set conflict can be found selectively in the Gaussian component of the RT distributions which
is typically associated with stimulus-based cognitive processing
(Kieffaber et al., 2006).
Thus, Experiment 2 was designed with the intent to distinguish
decisional processing occurring before response selection from
response execution. To do this, the procedure from Experiment 1
was modified so that participants moved a cursor from a starting
location at the bottom of the screen to one of two boxes representing the category judgments, rather than simply pressing a
button corresponding to each decision. This permitted quantification of two components of the response time: 1) Decision time
(DT) is the time it takes a participant to initiate action, and 2)
Motor time (MT) is the time it takes to complete the selected
action. The separation of RT into these two constituents was
motivated by the following hypotheses: (1) Stimulus-set (SWS)
switching and stimulus-set conflict (SIRC) will be more likely to
affect the DT component of RT because the cognitive representation of task-set depicted in Figure 2 implies that stimulus-set
governs information processing related to perceptual input and
abstract decisions about stimulus identity. (2) Response-set switching (SWSR) and response-set conflict (SCRI) will be more likely to
affect the MT component of response-time because the cognitive
representation of task-set depicted in Figure 2 also implies that
response-set governs information processing related to the mapping of abstract judgments to overt responses.
Predictions with respect to the dissociation between DT and MT
are most compelling in the context of task-set conflict. Recall that
a critical prediction of the internal task-set structure depicted in

Figure 2 is that the RT costs of response-set conflict will be
substantially less than stimulus-set conflict as a result of the
accumulation of task-set filters. Thus, if the DT component of RT
is sensitive to stimulus, but not response-set conflict, then DTs on
SCRI trials will be significantly less than those on SIRC trials and
not different from SCRC trials, replicating the results of Experiment 1. However, because MT is assumed to commence subsequent to stimulus identification/categorization, it may not benefit
from the cumulative filtering of stimulus-set and response-set,
relying primarily on the resolution of conflict at the level of the
response-set. It is therefore predicted that increased susceptibility
to response-set conflict will lead to similarity between SCRI and
SIRC trials (attributable to RT slowing on SCRI trials resulting
from response-set conflict and RT acceleration on SIRC trials
resulting from the benefits of response-set congruency) as well as
a significant difference between SCRI and SCRC trials (indicating
significant costs of response-set conflict).

Method
Participants. Forty-five (30 female, 15 male) from the University of Pittsburgh received partial credit in an introductory
psychology course for their participation. The average age of
participants was 18.6 (SD ⫽ 0.68) years. The experiment was
conducted with the understanding and consent of each participant
and in accordance with the Institutional Review Board at the
University of Pittsburgh. All participants reported normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision.
Apparatus & stimuli. A schematic of the task is presented in
Figure 7. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the same as
in Experiment 1 with the following two exceptions: (1) The Shape
and Size rules were mapped to the Same/Different judgment and
the Color rule was mapped to the Red/Blue judgment for all
participants, and (2) Same/Different and Red/Blue responses were
made by moving a mouse cursor from a central position at the
bottom of the screen to one of two positions to the left and right of
the target stimulus. These positions were indicated by black
squares and contained the response labels in white letters. Cues
remained on the screen for 500 ms and were followed by a blank
screen for another 500 ms. Target figures remained on screen until
a response was made by the participant. Feedback regarding accuracy was provided as soon as a response was made and remained
on the screen until the participant returned the cursor to a central
position at the bottom of the screen. This position was indicated by
a small black box labeled with the word, Home. A 1000-ms
intertrial interval preceded the onset of the next cue. The task
included 480 trials (four blocks of 120) with each of the three
Switch and four Congruency types equally represented across the
experiment.
Response time measures. Decision Time (DT) was defined
as the time between the presentation of the target figures and the
initiation of cursor movement. Movement initiation was defined as
any change in the vertical or horizontal position of the cursor of
more than 8 pixels. This definition provided some tolerance for
subtle cursor movement unrelated to response execution. Motor
Time (MT) was defined as the time between the initiation of the
movement and the completion of the movement. Movement completion was defined as the time at which the cursor crossed any of
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Figure 7.

Procedural schematic of Experiment 2.

the boundaries defined by the response boxes to the left and right
of the target figures.
Data analysis. Accuracy and response times were analyzed
separately in the same way as in Experiment 1 except that an
additional Response Component (DT, MT) factor was added to the
analysis of RTs. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p values are provided where appropriate.

Results and Discussion
Accuracy. Overall performance on the task was good (M ⫽
95.3%, SD ⫽ 3.6%). Accuracy rates were submitted to a Switch
(3: SWSR, SWS, ST) by Congruency (4: SCRC, SCRI, SIRC, SIRI)
repeated measures ANOVA. A significant main effect of Switch
indicated that there were accuracy costs associated with taskswitching, F(2, 88) ⫽ 13.5; p ⬍ .01. Planned comparisons revealed that although accuracy was significantly reduced on SWS
(M ⫽ 94.5%, SD ⫽ 4.6%) compared with ST (M ⫽ 96.4%, SD ⫽
5.0%) trials, p ⬍ .001, there were no differences in accuracy costs
across SWSR trials (M ⫽ 94.7%, SD ⫽ 4.6%) and SWS trials.
The effect of Congruency was also significant in the accuracy
rates, F(3, 132) ⫽ 42.6; p ⬍ .001. Planned comparisons revealed
that there were significant accuracy costs associated with SCRI
(M ⫽ 97.0%, SD ⫽ 4.0%) by comparison with SCRC (M ⫽ 98.9%,
SD ⫽ 1.3%) trials, p ⬍ .01, reflecting the impact of response-set
conflict. Significant accuracy costs were also observed in SIRC
(M ⫽ 93.3%, SD ⫽ 5.3%) by comparison with SCRC trials, p ⬍
.001, reflecting the impact of stimulus-set conflict. Finally, there

were significant accuracy costs observed in SIRC by comparison
with SCRI trials, p ⬍ .001, replicating Experiment 1 and reflecting
the predicted increase in conflict processing associated with
stimulus-set conflict. The interaction between Switch and Congruency was not statistically significant.
Response time. Means for each condition and response component (DT & MT) are illustrated in Figure 8. Response times (RT;
10% trimmed within each response component), excluding error
trials and trials immediately after an error, were submitted to a
Switch (3: SWSR, SWS, ST) by Congruency (4: SCRC, SCRI, SIRC,
SIRI) by Response Component (2: DT, MT) repeated measures
ANOVA. A main effect of Response Component indicated that DT
(M ⫽ 655 ms, SD ⫽ 204 ms) accounted for a much larger
proportion of the total response time than did MT (M ⫽ 269 ms,
SD ⫽ 100 ms), F(1, 44) ⫽ 291.9, p ⬍ .001. There were also
significant main effects of Switch, F(2, 88) ⫽ 4.3, p ⬍ .05, and
Congruency, F(3, 132) ⫽ 30.4; p ⬍ .001, but these were each
qualified by separate interactions with the Response Component
factor. Neither the two-way interaction between Switch and Congruency nor the three-way interaction between Switch, Congruency, and Response Component were statistically significant.
The interaction between Switch and Response Component, F(2,
88) ⫽ 7.0; p ⬍ .01, revealed that the time costs of task-switching
were significant only in the DT component of the total response
times, F(2, 88) ⫽ 9.9, p ⬍ .001. Planned comparisons confirmed
the expectation of significantly longer DTs to SWSR trials (M ⫽
684 ms, SD ⫽ 213 ms) than to SWS (M ⫽ 663 ms, SD ⫽ 213 ms)
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not statistically significant, consistent with the expectation that
response execution is more vulnerable to the impact of responseconflict.
Taken together, the results from Experiment 2 replicate and
extend those from Experiment 1. The DT component of response
time, reflecting movement onset, closely replicated the data from
Experiment 1 which used simple key-press responses in the following two ways. First, SWSR trials were associated with a significant switch costs compared with SWS trials. Second, responseset conflict elicited significantly smaller DT conflict costs as
evidenced by shorter DTs on SCRI compared with SIRC trials
and no difference between SCRC and SCRI trials. The data also
indicate that response execution, reflected in the MT component of RT, is more susceptible to the effects of response-set
conflict which is consistent with notion that the processes
governing MT commence following stimulus identification/
categorization and may thus not benefit from the cumulative
filtering of stimulus-set and response-set.

Experiment 3: Event-Related Brain Potentials

Figure 8. Experiment 2 response times shown separately for each of the
three switch and four congruency conditions and for each of the DT and
MT components (error bars reflect ⫾ 1 SE).

trials, p ⬍ .01, indicating an additional cost of switching the
response component of task-set. However, the costs of switching
stimulus-set alone (SWS – ST; M ⫽ 648ms, SD ⫽ 179 ms) were
not significant in the DT component of RT.
The interaction between Congruency and Response Component,
F(3, 132) ⫽ 7.7, p ⬍ .001, revealed differences in the way that
stimulus- and response-conflict impacted the two components of
total response time. Congruency effects in the DT component, F(3,
132) ⫽ 25.8; p ⬍ .001, replicated the findings in Experiment 1.
Planned comparisons revealed that DTs to SCRC (M ⫽ 633 ms,
SD ⫽ 216 ms) were not statistically different from SCRI (M ⫽ 639
ms, SD ⫽ 194 ms), indicating that response-set conflict was not
significant in the DT component of RT. Moreover, DTs to SCRI
were significantly shorter than those to SIRC (M ⫽ 689 ms, SD ⫽
200 ms), p ⬍ .001, confirming the expectation that DT would be
susceptible to stimulus-conflict.
Congruency effects were also significant in the MT component
of response time, F(3, 132) ⫽ 9.2; p ⬍ .001, but the pattern of
results suggested that both stimulus- and response-conflict had a
significant impact on the time to execute a motor response.
Planned comparisons revealed that MT in SCRI (M ⫽ 276 ms,
SD ⫽ 123 ms) was significantly slower than MT in SCRC trials
(M ⫽ 244 ms, SD ⫽ 106 ms), p ⬍ .001, indicating a significant
MT cost associated with response-set conflict. Critically, the comparison of MT in SCRI and SIRC (M ⫽ 276 ms, SD ⫽ 107 ms) was

The basis of Experiments 1 and 2 was the hypothetical cognitive
representation (i.e., internal structure) of task-set depicted in Figures 2 and 3. Implied by this depiction of task-set is that dissociable neural circuits are recruited on the basis of task instructions.
Thus, Experiment 3 was designed to determine whether the behavioral dissociations observed in Experiments 1 and 2 would also
be reflected in brain activity using event-related brain potentials
(ERPs). Combining measurement of ERPs and a cued taskswitching procedure (such as those used in Exp. 1 and 2) introduces two opportunities to address questions about the neural basis
of control and conflict in task-set switching. First, ERPs timelocked to the onset of the task cue provide an opportunity to
determine whether neural activity at the moment of the task-switch
is modulated by the nature of the operations being changed (e.g.,
SWS vs. SWSR). Second, the ERPs time-locked to the onset of the
target stimuli provide an opportunity to determine whether neural
indices of conflict processing are modulated by the nature of the
conflict (e.g., SCRI, vs. SIRC) encountered.
ERPs have been used on many occasions to investigate the
neural basis of task-set switching. A common finding is that a
posterior, late (i.e., 600 – 800 ms), positive component of the ERP
is increased in amplitude when participants are cued to switch
tasks (Hsieh, 2002; F. Karayanidis et al., 2003; Kieffaber &
Hetrick, 2005). This positivity has been demonstrated to be sensitive to a variety of factors relevant to task switching, including
memory retrieval, task-set configuration, and rule mapping (Jost et
al., 2008; Travers & West, 2008; Swainson, Jackson, & Jackson,
2006). With respect to the goals of the current research, Karayanidis (2010) recently reviewed this literature and concluded that
this switch positivity may be sensitive to both the stimulus-set and
response-set components of task-set given that it can be elicited by
(1) switching judgments on the same stimuli with bivalent stimuli
and univalent responses (Kieffaber & Hetrick, 2005), (2) by
switching judgments on the same stimuli with bivalent stimuli and
bivalent responses (Nicholson, Karayanidis, Bumak, Poboka, &
Michie, 2006), and (3) because its latency is prolonged when task
preparation includes overt stimulus-response mappings (Astle,
Jackson, & Swainson, 2008).
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The task-cue is sometimes also associated with pretarget negativity that is likely to be associated with general task preparation
processes (Karayanidis, 2010) but has also been shown to be
increased in amplitude when an overt response is required (Astle et
al., 2008). There is also evidence that the pretarget negativity is
sensitive to the remapping of effectors to response category (see
Karayanidis, 2010). Mueller, Swainson, and Jackson (2007) addressed this by comparing cue-locked ERPs to switches between
tasks with bivalent response mappings with cue-locked ERPs to
switches between tasks with univalent response mappings. A frontally distributed pretarget negativity was found to be larger in
amplitude on switch trials, but only in the condition with bivalent
response-mappings (Mueller et al., 2007).
In addition to the fact that univalent and bivalent task types were
blocked in the procedure used by Mueller et al., (2007), precluding
a direct statistical comparison between cue-locked ERPs to bivalent and univalent task-switches, switch trials in univalent response
conditions always included an effector switch. The task-set switching procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2 addresses these limitations by permitting direct comparisons between SWSR and SWS
trials within a single task block and without confounding effects of
effector switching. One possible outcome, indicating a localized
organization of the stimulus-set and response-set components of
task-set, is that cues indicating a SWSR switch will be associated
with modulation of both the posterior parietal ERP positivity and
a frontal ERP negativity whereas SWS switches will be associated
only with modulation of the posterior positivity. Alternatively,
some have argued for a more general, dimensional representation
of task-set in the brain (Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999). Thus, the
posterior positive component of the ERP, which is most commonly
implicated in studies of task switching, may reflect a generalized
switching operation, increasing in amplitude on SWSR compared
with SWS switches because of the additional cognitive effort
required.
The conceptual framework for conflict processing theory is
more fully developed in the ERP literature than the framework for
task-set switching. For example, there is a general consensus that
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) participates in the cognitive
control loop and may even serve the specific purpose of detecting
conflict and subsequently signaling an increase in cognitive control from other brain areas in order to resolve conflicts when they
occur (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Jones,
Cho, Nystrom, Cohen, & Braver, 2002). The N2 component of the
ERP is most commonly identified with conflict processing. The N2
has been demonstrated to be larger in amplitude (more negative)
under conditions of task conflict (Folstein & van Petten, 2008) and
has even been shown to respond in a graded way to parametric
manipulations of the level of conflict (Forster, Carter, Cohen, &
Cho, 2011). Several other ERP components have also been implicated in conflict processing. For example, West and colleagues
(2004) observed a conflict-modulated N450 in addition to N2 and
Hsieh & Liu (2008) also demonstrated conflict-based modulation
of ERPs in the 300 –700ms latency range.
Related efforts to dissociate the variety of conflict processing
mechanisms suggests that stimulus-conflict and response-conflict
will both be associated with larger N2 amplitude (West et al.,
2004; Wendt, Heldmann, Mnte, & Kluwe, 2007). Equivalent N2
amplitudes to SCRI and SIRC trials would be consistent with the
conflict monitoring hypothesis of the N2 component (Botvinick et
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al., 2001) given that conflict effects observed in RTs were so
different. Alternatively, Forster et al.’s (2011) demonstration that
N2 amplitude could be modulated parametrically with the level of
stimulus-conflict suggests that N2 amplitude may be smaller to
SCRC and SCRI stimuli and larger to SIRC and SIRI stimuli because
of the additional cognitive conflict observed in the latter trial types.
Such a finding would be more consistent with claims that the N2
component is related to outcome evaluation and decision-making
(see Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, & Cohen, 2004).
The fact that SCRI trials did not elicit any significant conflict
costs in total response time (Exp. 1) or in the DT component of RT
(Exp. 2) has been interpreted as support for the hypothesis that
response-set conflicts elicit less between-task interference. This
interpretation depends on the assumption that the stimulus-conflict
and response-conflict engendered by the arbitrary mappings depicted in Figure 2 are similarly processed by the brain. Thus, an
important question is whether conventional ERP markers of conflict processing such as the N2 and N450 components are modulated by the types of conflict processing distinctions articulated in
the present research.
Taken together, previous findings argue strongly for a neural
dissociation between stimulus-set and response-set in taskswitching and conflict processing, however previous results derive
from indirect, block-wise comparisons of set-switching trials and
from measures of conflict processing that capitalize on overlearned
responses (e.g., word reading) or preexisting response predispositions. Thus, the primary aims of Experiment 3 were to (1) make
direct comparisons between SWSR and SWS trials in the cuelocked ERP and (2) determine whether the behavioral dissociation
between stimulus-set conflict and response-set conflict observed in
Experiments 1 and 2 is also reflected in components of the
stimulus-locked ERP.

Method
Participants. Thirty (22 male) participants from the College
of William & Mary either received partial credit in an introductory
psychology course for their participation or were compensated at
the rate of $10/hour. The average age of participants was 18.6
(SD ⫽ .68) years. The experiment was conducted with the understanding and consent of each participant and in accordance with
the Institutional Review Board at the College of William & Mary.
All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity and normal color vision.
Apparatus & stimuli. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
were the same as in Experiment 2 with the exception that participants were seated in an electrically shielded booth and fitted with
EEG cap. Movement was minimized by positioning the computer
mouse on an adjustable laptop stand beneath the right arm so that
participants could maintain a comfortable sitting position with his
or her arm in a relaxed position and back against the chair throughout the recording session.
Behavioral data analysis. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the
primary hypotheses were tested against the response time measures only from the two comparison tasks (Shape & Size). Accuracy rates for the 12 trial types created by the factorial combination
of the Switch (SWSR, SWS, and ST) and Congruency (SCRC, SCRI,
SIRC, and SIRI) factors were submitted to a Switch (3) ⫻ Congruency (4) repeated measures ANOVA. Response times were
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analyzed in the same way as the accuracy data except that an
additional Response Component (DT, MT) factor was added.
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p values are provided where appropriate.
Electrophysiological recordings and analysis. Electrophysiological data were recorded continuously at 2000 samples per
second using a DBPA-1 Sensorium bio-amplifier (Sensorium Inc.,
Charlotte, VT) with an analog high-pass filter of 0.01 Hz and a
low-pass filter of 500 Hz (four-pole Bessel). Recordings were
made using fabric caps bearing 72 Ag-AgCl sintered electrodes
(Electrode Arrays, El Paso, TX) while participants were seated in
an electrically shielded booth. EEG recordings were made using a
forehead ground electrode and a reference at the tip of the nose.
Vertical and horizontal eye movement was recorded from perioccular electrodes placed on the superior and inferior orbits (centered with the pupil) and from electrodes placed at the lateral
canthi, respectively. All impedances were adjusted to within 0 –20
kilohms at the start of the recording session.
EEG data were decimated to 250 Hz and analyzed off-line using
EMSE (Source Signal Imaging, San Diego, CA) and the Mass
Univariate ERP Toolbox in MatLab (http://openwetware.org/wiki/
Mass_Univariate_ERP_Toolbox). As a preliminary data screening, individual channels were inspected in 1-s segments over the
entire recording epoch. Channels containing extreme values (⫾300
V) in more than 40% of the sweeps were automatically marked
for replacement by interpolation. Additionally, individual segments in which more than 20 (28%) of the channels were contaminated by such extreme artifact were automatically marked for
removal. The results of this procedure were verified and/or modified as necessary by an experienced user. The data were then
corrected for ocular artifact using independent components analysis (Tzyy-Ping et al., 2000), smoothed using a low-pass filter with
a half-amplitude at 20 Hz (18dB/Octave). The EEG Data were then
segmented between ⫺200 ms and 1000 ms with respect to stimulus onset. Individual segments containing voltages exceeding
⫾100V were removed from the analysis. Data segments were
then averaged for each subject within each condition.
The multichannel data were then analyzed using a massive univariate analysis (Lage-Castellanos, Martinez-Montes, HernandezCabrera, & Galan, 2009). Briefly, this procedure involved the
following steps: (1) For every channel and sample, differences in
mean amplitude were tested across trial types using a repeated
measures ANOVA. In the case of the cue-locked analysis, these
tests included three levels of a Switch factor (SWSR, SWS, ST) and
in the case of the target-locked analysis there were four levels of
a Congruency factor (SCRC, SCRI, SIRC, SIRI). Analysis of the
target-locked ERPs was limited to the levels Congruency in an
effort to selectively address the current hypotheses. In addition to
limiting the number of exploratory hypothesis tests, selective focus
on the effects of Congruency was also motivated by the fact that
the factorial combination of Switch and Congruency would have
yielded only approximately 20 trials per cell on average and would
have required separate massive univariate analyses for each of the
main effects and interaction. (2) The resulting family of p values
were then submit to the Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli (2006)
procedure for controlling the false discovery rate (FDR). (3) Only
those channels/samples at which the p value exceeds a critical
value defined by a FDR of q ⬍ .05 were considered. (4) Clusterlevel statistics (e.g., means and SDs) were then computed by

defining “clusters” of activation using a spatial contiguity threshold of three consecutive sensors and a temporal contiguity threshold of two consecutive samples. Clusters were defined in the
following way: (1) Groups of significant activations exceeding the
spatial contiguity threshold were identified within each sample. (2)
Groups in consecutive samples wherein the number of sensors
common to the two groups exceeded 50% of the number of sensors
in the group with the fewest sensors were clustered together. (3)
Individual sensors within each cluster failing to meet the temporal
contiguity threshold were removed from the cluster.

Results and Discussion
Behavioral data. Overall performance on the task was good
(M ⫽ 96.7%, SD ⫽ 2.1%). Accuracy rates were submitted to a
Switch (3: SWSR, SWS, ST) by Congruency (4: SCRC, SCRI, SIRC,
SIRI) repeated measures ANOVA. Only the main effect of Congruency reached significant in the accuracy rates, F(3, 87) ⫽ 22.9,
p ⬍ .001. Planned comparisons revealed significant accuracy costs
associated with both response-set conflict (SCRI; M ⫽ 97.8%,
SD ⫽ 2.1%), p ⬍ .01, and stimulus-set conflict (SIRC; M ⫽ 95.7%,
SD ⫽ 3.8%), p ⬍ .01, by comparison with no conflict trials (SCRC;
M ⫽ 99.2%, SD ⫽ 1.1%). Moreover, accuracy rates were significantly lower in SIRC than SCRI trials, p ⬍ .01, indicating that
more errors were committed under conditions of stimulus-set
conflict.
Response times (RT; 10% trimmed), excluding error trials and
trials immediately after an error, were submitted to a Switch (3:
SWSR, SWS, ST) by Congruency (4: SCRC, SCRI, SIRC, SIRI) by
Response Component (2: DT, MT) repeated measures ANOVA.
Means for each condition and response component are illustrated
in Figure 9. The results largely replicated Experiment 2. A main
effect of Response Component indicated that DTs (M ⫽ 718 ms,
SD ⫽ 192 ms) accounted for a much larger proportion of the total
response time than did MTs (M ⫽ 314 ms, SD ⫽ 98 ms),
F(1, 29) ⫽ 126.32, p ⬍ .001. There were also significant main
effects of Switch, F(2, 58) ⫽ 6.52, p ⬍ .01, and Congruency, F(3,
87) ⫽ 28.68, p ⬍ .001. Significant interactions with the Response
Component factor were only observed for congruency.
Although the three-way interaction between Switch, Congruency, and Response Component was not significant, there was a
significant interaction between Switch and Congruency (averaging
over DT and MT), F(6, 174) ⫽ 2.67, p ⬍ .05. The pattern of
results was similar the results of Experiment 1 which used only a
measure of total response time. Considering the effects of taskswitching at each level of the Congruency factor revealed a significant main effect of Switch only within SCRC, F(2, 58) ⫽ 4.16,
p ⬍ .05, and SCRI, F(2, 58) ⫽ 3.85, p ⬍ .05. Similar to the results
of Experiment 1, pairwise comparisons between the levels of
Switch within the SCRC and SCRI levels of Congruency revealed
that the effect of task-switching was driven by significant differences between SWSR and ST trials, p ⬍ .05. Although the significant increase in response-time to SWSR trials in SCRI trials supports the hypothesis that response conflict will selectively impact
switches of response-set, the fact that similar increases are observed in SCRC trials is again inconsistent with the idea that
task-conflict is related to the slowing of RTs on SWSR trials.
In contrast with the results of Experiment 2 the interaction
between Switch and Response Component did not reach signifi-

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

STIMULUS AND RESPONSE SET

Figure 9. Experiment 3 response times shown separately for each of the
three switch and four congruency conditions and for each of the DT and
MT components (error bars reflect ⫾ 1 SE).

cance. However, similar to the results of Experiment 2, DT increased monotonically from ST (M ⫽ 713ms, SD ⫽ 192ms) to
SWS (M ⫽ 711ms, SD ⫽ 187ms) to SWSR (M ⫽ 737, SD ⫽
204ms). However, planned comparisons revealed that the difference between SWS and SWSR was only marginally significant,
t(29) ⫽ 1.92, p ⫽ .06. Also similar to Experiment 2, consideration
of MT alone revealed no significant differences in the omnibus
comparison of the levels of the Switch factor.
An interaction between Congruency and Response Component,
F(3, 87) ⫽ 5.91, p ⬍ .01, revealed differences in the way that
stimulus- and response-conflict impacted the two components of
total response time. Congruency effects in the DT component, F(3,
87) ⫽ 25.84, p ⬍ .001, replicated Experiments 1 and 2. DTs to
SCRC (M ⫽ 675 ms, SD ⫽ 187 ms) and SCRI (M ⫽ 694 ms, SD ⫽
190 ms) trials were not significantly different from one another,
indicating that response-set conflict did not have a significant
impact on DT. Moreover, DT in SCRI trials was significantly faster
than in SIRC (M ⫽ 756 ms, SD ⫽ 201 ms), p ⬍ .001, again
indicating that the only source of significant processing delays in
DT were elicited by stimulus-conflict.
Congruency effects were also significant in the MT component
of response time, F(3, 87) ⫽ 5.13; p ⬍ .01, with the pattern of
results qualitatively identical to the results for MT in Experiment
2. MT in SCRI (M ⫽ 315 ms, SD ⫽ 111 ms) trials was significantly
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longer than in SCRC trials (M ⫽ 291 ms, SD ⫽ 89 ms), p ⬍ .05,
indicating a significant cost of response-set conflict. Also, and in
accordance with predictions the difference between SCRI and SIRC
trials was not statistically significant; a finding consistent with the
hypothesis that response execution is more vulnerable to the impact of response-set conflict/congruency.
Electrophysiological data. Figure 10 depicts the cue-locked
grand averages for a selection of midline channels. There were two
significant clusters of activation indicated by the massive univariate analysis. The first cluster, hereafter referred to as N1C,
spanned the time between 172 and 184 ms, corresponded with the
peak amplitude of the N1 ERP component, and possessed a bilateral posterior distribution (P9, P8, PO9, PO7, PO8). The second
cluster, hereafter referred to as LPCC, spanned the time between
624 and 960 ms, corresponded with the peak amplitude of the late
positive component (LPC) of the ERP, and possessed a broad
distribution over central and posterior scalp (C3, C1, C2, CP5,
CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, P5, P3, P1, Pz, P2, P4, P6, PO7, PO3, POz,
PO4, PO8, O1, O2, Oz). Planned comparisons between each of the
Switch conditions were carried out by calculating cluster means
for each condition, averaging the conventional ERP voltage across
the channels and samples included in the cluster. The mean amplitudes for each cluster and condition are presented in Figure 11.
This analysis revealed that amplitudes of the N1C in SWSR (M ⫽
⫺.09, SE ⫽ .55) and SWS (M ⫽ .18, SE ⫽ .63) trials were
significantly smaller (more negative) than in ST (M ⫽ .92, SE ⫽
.61) trials, t(28) ⫽ 3.7/2.8, p ⬍ .01, but not significantly different
from one another. This pattern of results suggests that the N1C was
modulated by a change in the cue (and thus task) type, but not by
the specific requirements of the task switch. In contrast, pairwise
comparisons between conditions on the LPCC cluster revealed that
the amplitude of the LPCC increased significantly from ST (M ⫽
⫺.75, SE ⫽ .53) to SWS (M ⫽ .15, SE ⫽ .51) trials, t(28) ⫽ 3.27,
p ⬍ .01, and from SWS to SWSR (M ⫽ .88, SE ⫽ .49) trials,
t(28) ⫽ 2.64, p ⬍ .05. This pattern of increasing amplitude with
switch-type is consistent with the prediction that the LPC would be
modulated by the specific requirements of a task switch.
Figure 12 illustrates the results of the analysis of the electrophysiological data time-locked to the onset of the target stimulus.
There were three significant clusters of activation. The first cluster,
hereafter referred to as N2C, spanned the period of time between
260 ms and 276 ms, corresponded with the peak amplitude of the
N2 component of the ERP and was distributed over frontal scalp
sites (F1, F2, F4, FCz). The second cluster, hereafter referred to as
P3C, spanned 320 ms to 416 ms, and corresponded with the peak
amplitude of an occipitally distributed, bilateral P3 component of
the ERP (C4, CP2, CP4, CP6, P9, P7, P5, P3, P2, P4, P6, P8, PO9,
PO7, PO3, POz, PO4, PO8, PO10, O1, Oz, O2). The third cluster,
hereafter referred to as FCPC, spanned 424 to 660 ms and corresponded with a fronto-central positive component of the ERP
(FP1, FPz, FP2, AF7, AF3, AF4, AF8, F7, F5, F3, F1, FZ, F2, F4,
F6, FC5, FC3, FC1, FCZ, FC2, FC4, FC6, C5, C3, C1, CZ, C2,
C4, CP3, CP1, CPZ, CP2, CP4, CP6, P5, P3, P1, PZ, P2, P4, PO4).
Planned comparisons of cluster means between levels of conflict
were carried out in the same way as for the analysis of the
cue-locked clusters. The cluster means and the results of the paired
comparisons are presented in Table 1.
This cluster-level analysis (see Figure 13) indicated that the
amplitude of N2C was significantly smaller (more negative) for
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Figure 10. A, Grand-average, cue-locked ERPs from select midline channels. Highlighted regions correspond
to the time courses of the N1 (N1C) and LPC (LPCC) clusters. B, Topographical distribution of the mean effect
size (2) across samples for each of the electrodes included in the cluster (“halo” extending beyond head
boundary represents electrodes on the lateral surfaces of the scalp).

each of the three (SCRI, SIRC, and SIRI) conditions containing task
conflict compared with the no-conflict (SCRC) condition. This
pattern suggests that N2C reflects only the detection of conflict and
is not sensitive to the quantity or nature of the conflict encountered.
The pattern of differences in the P3C component also suggested
a sensitivity to conflict, however, that sensitivity appears to be
modulated by the nature of the conflict encountered. Amplitudes of
the P3C were significantly larger for both SCRC and SCRI trials
compared with SIRC and SIRI trials.
The FPCC cluster evidenced a statistical pattern that was similar
to that of the P3C cluster, however the polarity of the effect was
reversed. Amplitudes for the SIRC and SIRI conditions were significantly larger than those in SCRI and SCRC conditions.
Taken together, these results replicate and extend the findings
from Experiments 1 and 2. First, SWSR trials were associated with
a significant switch costs compared with SWS trials in the DT

component of RT. Second, response-set conflict elicited significantly smaller RT conflict costs in the DT component as evidenced
by reduced latencies on SCRI compared with SIRC trials and by the
equivalence of SCRC and SCRI trials. Finally, the behavioral data
indicate that response execution (MT) but not decision time (DT)
may be increased when there is response-set conflict.
Examination of the cue-locked ERP data provided support for
the hypothetical internal structure of task-set presented in Figure 2
given that SWSR elicited a significant increase in the amplitude of
a late positive component of the ERP. Moreover, the pattern of
results in the target-locked analysis suggests the following: (1)
stimulus-set and response-set conflict are similarly detected as
reflected in the frontally distributed N2 component, (2) the presence of stimulus- but not response-conflict impacts perceptual
processing and is associated with reduced ERP amplitude over
occipital cortex between 320 and 416 ms, and (3) stimulus-conflict
but not response-conflict significantly impacts response resolution
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Figure 11. Mean (⫾ 1 SE) cluster-level amplitudes averaged across time
and electrodes for each cluster.

processes as evident in the amplitude of a fronto-central positivity
between 424 ms and 660 ms.

General Discussion
The primary aim of the present research was to test the hypothesis that stimulus-set and response-set reflect distinct components
of the internal structure of task-set. This hypothesis was supported
in the findings that (1) task set-switches that included a switch of
both stimulus-set and response-set resulted in larger residual
switch costs than switches of stimulus-set alone, (2) response-set
conflict resulted in significantly smaller response time costs than
did stimulus-set conflict, (3) Stimulus-set conflict impacted the DT
component of participant’s response time, whereas the MT component was more sensitive to response-set conflict, and (4) finally,
ERPs evidenced dissociations between stimulus-set and responseset both in the cue-locked measures of task-set switching and in the
target-locked measures of conflict processing.
The arbitrary nature of stimulus–judgment and judgment–
response mappings used in the present research is particularly
important given that conflict processing may be both qualitatively
and quantitatively different under conditions wherein stimulus–
response congruency is determined by well-learned compared with
novel judgment-response mappings (Meiran & Kessler, 2008).
This is important because previous attempts to dissociate stimulus
from response conflict tend to elicit conflict processing using
Stroop stimuli wherein the effect relies on an overlearned predis-
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position to read words rather than report the color in which they
are printed.
Explicit consideration of the internal structure of the task-sets
used to measure cognitive control in task-set switching research is
seldom given. A notable exception is the taxonomy of “cognitive
ensembles” developed by Kornblum & Lee (1995) in an effort
describe the factors contributing to Stroop-like stimulus–response
compatibility effects. By their account, stimulus–response (S-R)
overlap occurs whenever there is a direct correspondence between
the nature of the response and the semantic or physical properties
of the stimulus. For example, responding to colors by verbalizing
color names or responding to a stimulus’ physical location by
responding with the corresponding left or right hand (e.g., Simon
& Wolf, 1963). Although cognitive ensembles are closely related
to the concept of internal structure examined in the present research, there are important differences between the notion of S-R
overlap (Kornblum & Lee, 1995), and the present notion of conflict processing (De Houwer, 2003; van Veen & Carter, 2006;
Brass et al., 2003) wherein response-set interference is a product of
arbitrary judgment-to-response mappings rather than a direct semantic and/or spatial association between stimuli and responses.
One potential caveat to the interpretation of the present data is
that the predicted effects of task-set switching may also be interpreted with respect to the counterintuitive finding that switch costs
are larger when switching from a weak to a stronger (i.e., dominant
or well-practiced) task. Allport et al., (1994, see also; Wylie &
Allport, 2000) reported that switch costs were largest when participants switched from color naming to word reading using incongruent Stroop stimuli. This finding is surprising because one
might expect that the task-set for word reading (arguably the most
familiar and dominant response to Stroop stimuli) would be almost
effortlessly actuated. This asymmetry of switch costs has been
interpreted to reflect a stronger residual inhibitory trace for word
reading that previously maximized processing efficiency during
color naming. Because the comparison judgments in the present
task occurred more frequently throughout the present experiment
(66% of trials), one might reasonably argue that the task set
associated with the Comparison judgment must be more strongly
inhibited during performance of the Identity task, resulting in
larger switch costs when switching to comparison from identity
judgments. However, the fact that SWSR costs in the Identity task
were similar in magnitude to SWSR costs in the Comparison (see
Experiment 1) task despite the fact that response times were
generally much faster in the identity task, provides a significant
challenge to this alternative explanation. Moreover, Monsell
(2000) provide evidence that this asymmetry of switch costs is not
a universal finding and, perhaps most relevant to the present task,
Monsell (2003) reported that this asymmetry does not hold when
the response-set also changes across tasks.
Analysis of the cue-locked and stimulus-locked brain potentials in Experiment 3 also motivate a compelling argument for
the dissociation of stimulus-set and response-set processes using the present task. Amplitude of the LPC component of the
ERP time-locked to the cue, indicating which dimension and
response mapping were relevant on the current trial, was observed to increase monotonically from ST to SWS to SWSR
trials. The time-course and distribution of the LPC are consistent with ERPs elicited by similar cues in previous research
(Kieffaber & Hetrick, 2005; Kieffaber et al., 2007; Rushworth,
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Figure 12. A, Target-locked grand-average ERPs from select midline channels. The time course of each cluster
is highlighted in gray. B, Topographical distribution of the mean effect size (2) across samples for each of the
electrodes included in the cluster (“halo” extending beyond head boundary represents electrodes on the lateral
surfaces of the scalp).

Passingham, & Nobre, 2005; Swainson et al., 2006; Karayanidis, 2010). Additionally, the LPC was modulated by the number
of dimensions (i.e., stimulus & response) of the task-set being
switched, a finding consistent with the claim that the cue-locked
LPC reflects a forward-acting component of the neural response
during task-switching. In addition to the fact that this increase
in amplitude corresponded with similar monotonic increases in
the switch costs, the fact that the amplitude of this component
is significantly larger for SWSR compared with SWS trials is
consistent with findings reported by Astle, Jackson, and Swainson (2008) and suggests that the LPC consists of a number of
subcomponents that are sensitive to both stimulus-set and
response-set switching.
Some prior research suggests that the cue-locked LPC component and ERP modulation over the frontal cortex reflect the

stimulus-set and response-set components task-set respectively
(Molden et al., 1998; Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre, 2002).
However, the present findings with respect to the neural mechanisms of anticipatory task-switching are more consistent with the
notion of a generalized switching operation over posterior parietal
cortex. This generalized switching operation may reflect a dimensional representation of task-set in the brain, recruiting neural
resources in accordance with the number of dimensions that are
changed across a task switch (Kleinsorge & Heuer, 1999).
Analysis of the ERPs time-locked to the onset of the target
stimulus also nicely complemented the behavioral data from all
three experiments with respect to task-set conflict. Significant RT
costs were associated with response-set conflict in Experiment 1
(SCRI ⬎ SCRC), but Experiments 2 & 3 demonstrated that this
difference is limited to the MT component of RT. Response-set
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Table 1
Uncorrected Pairwise Comparisons of Cluster Amplitudes (V)
Across Levels of Conflict
Conflict
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Mean
(SD)
N2C
SCRC
SCRI
SIRC
SIRI
P3C
SCRC
SCRI
SIRC
SIRI
FPCC
SCRC
SCRI
SIRC
SIRI
ⴱ

SCRC

SCRI

SIRC

SIRI

2.04 (.96)
0.69 (.87)
0.54 (.87)
0.92 (.94)

—

—
—
NS
NS

—
—
—
NS

—
—
—
—

6.72 (.80)
6.48 (.90)
5.31 (.82)
5.41 (.87)

—
NS

—
—

ⴱ

ⴱ

—
—
—
NS

—
—
—
—

3.14 (.71)
2.76 (.70)
4.42 (.72)
4.65 (.92)

—
NS

—
—

ⴱ

ⴱ

—
—
—
NS

—
—
—
—

ⴱ
ⴱ
ⴱ

ⴱ

ⴱ

ⴱ

ⴱ
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2005), and the timing (310 – 416 ms) and topography of the P3
suggest that stimulus-set conflict impacted perceptual processes
related to the extraction of relevant stimulus features.
Conflict effects in the FCP component over fronto-central scalp
were similar to P3, but in the opposite direction. FCP amplitudes
were significantly increased on trials containing stimulus– conflict.
Taken together, the average DT of 718 ms and the timing (424 –
660 ms) and topography of FCP effects suggests that this component of the ERP may reflect increased effort in the selection of
“action sets” in the superior frontal gyrus (Rushworth, Walton,
Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004) when faced with stimulusconflict. Previous efforts to dissociate the components of conflict
processing have indicated that an N450 component with a similar
topography to the FCP is elicited by task-conflict. Using a numeric
version of the Stroop task, West et al. (2004) demonstrated that

p ⬍ .01.

conflict also elicited an increase in the amplitude of an N2 component of the stimulus-locked ERP. The N2 component, which is
commonly linked with activity in the ACC, has been widely
reported to be increased in amplitude under conditions of taskconflict (See Folstein & van Petten, 2008, for a review). For
example, West et al. (2004) and Wendt et al. (2007) report that the
N2 component is modulated by a variety of conflict types. The task
used by Wendt et al. (2007) is most conceptually similar to the
current procedure. Using arbitrary stimulus-response mappings
and bivalent responses, Wendt et al. (2007) demonstrated that N2
amplitude was enhanced under conditions both stimulus and response conflict, but that the degree of enhancement was not
modulated by the type of conflict. The present results replicate this
finding, suggesting that the role of N2-related ACC activity is to
detect conflict, irrespective of its source or magnitude. One caveat
to this interpretation is the recent finding that N2 amplitude responds in a graded way to parametric manipulations of conflict
(Forster et al., 2011). One possibility is that the amplitude of the
N2 is modulated by the degree of conflict within but not across
conflict types.
Stimulus-conflict elicited significantly greater RT costs in Experiment 1 (SIRC ⬎ SCRI) and this difference was only significant
in the DT component of RT in Experiments 2 and 3, providing
support for the claim that stimulus-set conflict selectively impacts
cognitive processes related to stimulus classification but not response execution. Similarly, the P3 and FCP components of the
stimulus-locked ERP were modulated by the type of conflict
encountered. Conflict effects in these two components were both
qualitatively and statistically similar to the conflict effects in the
DT component of RT in Experiments 2 and 3, dissociating the four
conflict types only on the basis of the presence of stimulusconflict. The P3 component was maximal over occipital scalp and
was reduced in amplitude on those trials containing stimulus–
conflict (i.e., SIRC & SIRI). The reduction in amplitude of the P3 in
response to stimulus– conflict is consistent with similar findings
using a Stroop task (West, Jakubek, Wymbs, Perry, & Moore,

Figure 13. Mean (⫾ 1 SE) cluster amplitudes for each Cluster across
each condition.
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greater negativity of the N450 was elicited by irrelevant attributes
of a Stroop stimulus regardless of whether the irrelevant attribute
was mapped to one of the currently relevant responses. The fact
that the N450 appears sensitive to stimulus– conflict irrespective of
response mappings complements the current finding that the FCP
is selectively modulated by stimulus– conflict. However, a noteworthy difference is that the N450 is typically more negative in
response to conflict (West et al. 2004, 2005; Chen, Bailey, Tiernan, & West, 2011), whereas the FCP in the present data are more
positive in amplitude on SIRC and SIRI trials. Future research may
be needed to determine whether these differences reflect the activation of distinct neural circuitry engaged by the two tasks, or are
simply attributable to EEG recording parameters such as the
choice of a reference channel (e.g., nose-tip vs. common average).
Theoretical differences in the way stimulus-set and response-set
are conceptualized may also contribute to differences between this
and previous research. Variants of the Stroop task with bivalent
responses wherein each response was correct for more than one of
the color names have been used to dissociate “stimulus conflict”
from “response conflict” (van Veen & Carter, 2005; Chen et al.,
2011). However, van Veen and Carter (2005) defined semantic
incongruence as those trials in which the two dimensions of the
target stimulus (e.g., ink color and word identity) were different,
but both indicated the same overt response. Similarly, Chen et al.,
(2011) defined “stimulus conflict” as those trials in which the two
dimensions of the target stimulus were different, but the irrelevant
dimension was not associated with any of the task-relevant responses. These conceptualizations of stimulus-set interference are
critically different from stimulus-set conflict as it is presently
defined wherein the two dimensions of a target stimulus share an
overlapping set of abstract judgments (e.g., same/different) and
judgment-response mappings, but indicate competing overt responses.
In fact, this important theoretical distinction may help to explain
why van Veen et al. (2001) found an increased N2 amplitude for
only “response-incongruence.” Chen et al. (2011) likewise report
an increased (more negative) amplitude of medial frontal negativity (350 ms to 500 ms) for “response interference” by comparison
with “stimulus interference.” The fact that, unlike “stimulusincongruence” as defined by van Veen et al., (2001) and “stimulus
interference” as defined by Chen et al. (2011), stimulus-set
conflict in the present experiment does involves the activation of
competing responses likely explains the present finding of an
increased N2 amplitude for both SCRI and SIRC trials.
Some research also suggests that the N450 component of the
ERP is sensitive to task conflict, but does not differentiate the
stimulus and response conflict types (e.g., West et al., 2004). It is
again difficult to integrate this finding with the present research
because of differences in the way conflict types are defined. West
(2004) used a definition of stimulus-conflict that is similar to
Kornblum and Lee’s (1995) notion of S-R overlap wherein the
conflict emerges because of a direct semantic correspondence
between a stimulus (e.g., the word BLUE written in red ink) and
the set of possible responses (e.g., the utterances “red” and “blue”),
whereas response conflict in the present case was due to an
arbitrary mapping between “Same,” “Different,” “Red,” and
“Blue” decisions and the left/right response keys. It is also important to note that there were no significant differences between the
response times to the various conflict conditions in West et al.,

(2004) whereas conflict types are distinguished on both RT and
ERP measures in the current study.
Aiding interpretation of the present notions of stimulus-set and
response-set amid prior research is the hypothetical task-set architecture depicted in Figure 2. Specification of this internal structure
of task-set clarifies the way in which stimulus-set and response-set
may conceptualized as distinct cognitive biases which, when combined, cumulatively attenuate task-irrelevant information processing. The fact that stimulus-set conflict elicited longer response
times than response-set conflict in Experiments 1–3 provides compelling support for this hypothetical architecture and the observed
increase in amplitude of the LPC ERP time-locked to the task-cue
indicates that each is a unique component of task-set that can be
prepared in advance.
In summary, the present findings provide strong support for the
notion that stimulus-set and response-set represent distinct components of the internal structure of task-set even when defined by
completely arbitrary stimulus-response mappings. It is clear that
the development of a more complete theoretical taxonomy of
task-set is needed to establish a consistent vernacular regarding the
various cognitive processes implied by the procedures used to
explore set effects. The continued development of our understanding regarding the specific information processing mechanisms that
constitute task-set effects is central to achieving resolution to the
ongoing debate over the nature of cognitive control, executive
functioning, and related deficits in clinical populations.
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Experiment 1: Supplementary Data Analysis
To address potential differences between the three tasks (i.e.,
Shape, Size, and Color) and the anticipated differences between
the two judgment types (i.e., Comparison and Identity judgments)
RTs (correct trials only) from each task and response mapping
were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with Task (3) as
a within-participants factor and Response-Mapping (3; Shape-ID,
Size-ID, and Color-ID) as a between-participants factor. The main
effect of Response-Mapping was not significant. The main effect
of Task was significant, F(2, 84) ⫽ 28.34, p ⬍ .001, and attributable to significantly faster response times for judgments involving the Color dimension (M ⫽ 651 ms, SE ⫽ 20 ms) than to either
the Shape (M ⫽ 715 ms, SE ⫽ 20 ms) or Size (M ⫽ 732 ms, SE ⫽
21 ms) dimensions, which did not significantly differ from one
another. However, this effect can be attributed, in part, to the
anticipated interaction between Task and Response-Mapping, F(4,
84) ⫽ 20.68, p ⬍ .001, wherein RTs tended to be faster for the
arguably simpler Identity judgment within each ResponseMapping condition (see Table A1). Although contrasts between
the comparison and identity tasks were complicated by the discrepancy between these two judgment types, behavioral results
from the identity task were analyzed separately by entering mean
accuracy and correct RTs (10% trimmed) into separate Switch (2;
SWSR and ST) by Congruency (3; CON, CONR1 and INCON)
repeated measures ANOVAs. Here, CON again refers to those
trials in which both of the alternative tasks designated a congruent
response, CONR1 refers to trials in which only one of the alternative tasks designated a congruent response, and INCON refers to
trials in which both of the alternative tasks designated an inconTable A1
Mean (SE) Response Times by Task and Response-Mapping
Task
Response-mapping

Shape

Size

Color

Shape-ID
Size-ID
Color-ID

644 (34)
764 (40)
795 (33)

717 (33)
656 (39)
791 (32)

657 (32)
654 (38)
625 (31)

gruent response. Recall that, in accordance with the schematic in
Figure 2, response-set conflict is the only type of conflict that can
impact performance of the Identity task.
Switch (i.e., SWSR) trials were associated with a significant
accuracy costs in the Identity task, F(1, 44) ⫽ 16.95, p ⬍ .001,
with a 3% decrease in accuracy for SWSR trials (M ⫽ 90.5%, SD ⫽
8.6) compared with ST trials (M ⫽ 93.5%, SD ⫽ 6.6). There were
no statistically significant effects of Congruency in the accuracy
rates, but there was evidence for an interaction between Switch and
Congruency, F(2, 88) ⫽ 4.99, p ⬍ .05. This interaction reflected
the fact that mean accuracy declined monotonically with increasing conflict within SWSR (i.e., CON [M ⫽ 91.9%, SD ⫽ 11.2] ⬎
CONR1 [M ⫽ 91.3%, SD ⫽ 9.28] ⬎ INCON [M ⫽ 88.1%, SD ⫽
11.9]) but not ST (e.g., CON [M ⫽ 92.7%, SD ⫽ 9.9] ⬍ CONR1
[M ⫽ 94.3%, SD ⫽ 7.3] ⬎ INCON [M ⫽ 93.6%, SD ⫽ 8.6]) trials.
Given the unusual qualitative nature of this pattern and the fact that
the analysis of the Identification task was secondary to the analysis
of the Comparison task, we do not comment further on this
interaction.
SWSR trials were also associated with significant RT switch
costs in the Identity task, F(1, 44) ⫽ 21.55, p ⬍ .001, wherein RTs
to switch trials (M ⫽ 690.64, SD ⫽ 149.03) were roughly 74 ms
longer than RTs to stay trials (M ⫽ 616.05, SD ⫽ 122.31).
Although the identity task is considered separately because of the
inherent differences between the comparison and identity judgments, it is noteworthy that the SWSR costs associated with this
task are more similar in magnitude to the SWSR costs (79 ms) than
to the SWS costs (43 ms) in the comparison task. There were no
statistically significant effects of Congruency or in the interaction
between Congruency and Switch for the Identity task. This finding
is consistent with the results for the Comparison task, indicating a
reduced vulnerability to the effects of between-task interference
when the interference results from response-set conflict.
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